Battle of the Frontiers
The Battle of the Frontiers occurred from 4 August to 6 September 1914. The Battle of the Frontiers refers to the first of the skirmishes that broke out shortly after the outbreak of WW1, on the western front.
It took place in France and Belgium, resulting in stunning victories for the Germans and many Allied setbacks and retreats. The German army almost seemed unstoppable, until the First Battle of Marne(6-12 September). There, a counterattack led by British and French troops was successful, thwarting German plans for a quick and decisive victory on the Western Front, and paved the way for years of trench warfare after that.
These collective clashes can been seen as the largest battle in human history up to that time, given the fact that a total of more than two million troops were involved.
The Battle of the Frontiers comprised five offensives launched under French Commander-in-Chief Joseph Joffre and German Chief of Staff Helmuth von Moltke's initiative during the first month of the war, August 1914. The battles - at Mulhouse, Lorraine, the Ardennes, Charleroi and Mons - were launched more or less simultaneously, and marked the collision of both French and German invasion plans. Each battle impacted the course of others.
The Battle of Mulhouse
The Battle of Mulhouse commenced the opening of a series of offensive led by the French, shortly after the start of WW1. It began at 05:00 on 7 August 1914.
The battle of Mulhouse was meant to retake Alsace and Lorraine, originally French territories that were captured by Germany as France lost the Franco-Prussian war of 1870-1871. The capture of these 2 towns would also be strategically important, as it would be used to protect the flank of a later French invasion further north
In command of the operation to take Mulhouse was General Bonneau, and he was assigned a detachment of the First Army, plus one cavalry and two infantry divisions. Ranged against him was the German Seventh Army under General von Heeringen.
Having crossed the frontier on the morning of 7 August, the French quickly seized the border town of Altkirch with a bayonet charge. However Bonneau, suspicious of the light state of the German defenses, was wary of advancing much further for fear of stepping into a German trap. However, under orders to move to the Rhine next day, Bonneau continued his advance, taking Mulhouse shortly after its German occupants had left the town.
The success was short-lived, however, as Geman reinforcements arrived from Strasbourg. The forces launched a counter-attack on the morning of 9th August at nearby Cernay
Due to a lack of reserve forces, Bonneau was unable to mount a concentrated defense and began to withdraw from the city from the same day.
, the French Commander-in-Chief, hastily despatched a reserve division to assist in the Joseph Joffredefence, but they arrived too late to save the town from recapture. Bonneau withdrew towards Belfort on 10 August in order to escape German encirclement.
Battle of Loraine
The French invasion of Lorraine, like Mulhouse, was supposed to regain lost territory in the Franco-Prussian war
One of the Battles of the Frontiers, the Invasion of Lorraine (also known as the Battle of Morhange-Sarrebourg) began with the French First and Second Armies entering the city on 14 August 1914, despite the failure of General Paul Pau's 8 August offensive at the Battle of Mulhouse, another key target near the Swiss border.
The French First Army, under General Auguste Dubail, intended to take Sarrebourg, east of Nancy, a strongly defended town, with General Noel de Castelnau's Second Army taking Morhange, similarly fortified The task of defending these towns fell to German Crown Prince Rupprecht, who had overall command of the German Sixth and General Josias von Herringen's Seventh Army.
Rupprecht implemented a strategy of apparently retreating under the force of the French attack, only to bounce back in a fierce, cleverly manoeuvred counter-attack, having lured the French armies into a strong attack upon a heavily defended position As the French armies advanced they encountered increasingly stern German opposition, including treacherous machine gun fire and heavy artillery.
Rupprecht, however, pressed German Army Chief of Staff Helmuth von Moltke to authorise a more aggressive strategy, under which the Germans would mount a counter-attack, the aim being to drive the French back to Nancy.
With Moltke's agreement the offensive was launched on 20 August, whilst de Castelnau's Second Army battered Morhange Caught by surprise and without the assistance of an entrenched position, Second Army was forced to fall back, eventually into France itself.
This in turn obliged General Dubail to retreat his First Army from Sarrebourg. Despite the German onslaught Ferdinand Foch's XX Corps managed to defend Nancy itself.
Gaps began to appear between the French armies, prompting Commander-in-Chief Joseph Joffreto withdraw the Army of Alsace - a bitter blow given the latter's recent success in retaking Mulhouse.
Eight days after the French offensive had begun, 22 August, both First and Second Armies were back to the fortress zones of Belfort, Epinal and Toul.
Diverting from the Schlieffen Plan, Rupprecht's forces were reinforced preparatory to an attack against the two French armies through the Trouee des Charmes, a natural gap between Epinal and Toul. However the French, through the successful use of reconnaissance aircraft, were alerted to the German's build-up and so prepared an adequate defence.
Attacked therefore on 24 August, German gains were minimal, limited to the acquisition of a small salient into French lines, itself reduced by heavy French counter-attacks on the morning of 25 August.
The French line held. Realistically the troops gathered for Rupprecht's offensive - which comprised 26 divisions of men - would have been put to far greater use at the First Battle of the Marne; however Rupprecht continued fighting until the end of the month, without success stalemate and trench warfare ensued.
Battle of Ardennes
The Battle of the Ardennes was fought from 21-23 August 1914.
The battle was mainly driven by the fact that mutually confused French and German forces clashed in the Ardennes forces. German forces protecting the area were expected to be light, and only French light artillery were sent to the Ardennes Forest.
By 20 August however, it was becoming apparent - first to General Lanrezac's French Fifth Army, and then to Commander-in-Chief Joseph Joffre - that a massive German presence was gathering in the area. That same day the Germans launched a counter-offensive against the French advance into Lorraine Even so, Joffre authorized an invasion of the Ardennes on 20 August for the following day.
Two sets of armies joined the battle on both French and German sides. General Pierre Ruffey's Third Army and, further north, General Fernand de Langle de Cary's Fourth Army, fought the German Fourth and Fifth Armies: the former led by Duke Albrecht, the latter by Crown Prince Wilhelm. The two German armies together formed the center of the German Schlieffen Plan's advance into France.
The French Fifth Army, in the meantime, were sent northward to Charleroi to investigate as there was the word of German forces gathering in Belgium.
German troops began to advance through the woods on 19 August, constructing defensive positions as they went French forces planned to attach the German center at its flank as the German forces passed through the Ardennes Forest. However, due to poor visibility caused by thick fog, the forces literally stumbled into each other.
In the midst of the confusion, the French mistook the opposition for a small German scout force. However, little did they know that the Germans outnumber them. Skirmishes took place on the first day of the battle, and widespread battle only occurred the following day.
Superior tactical positioning by the Germans more than offset the occasional French success, e.g. at Virton, although casualties were heavy on both sides French troops, dressed brightly, were notably conspicuous in the woods, no concession to camouflage having been considered.
The French, acting with 'offensive spirit', charged at German positions in the wood, only to be cut down by efficient machine gun fire, backed by heavy artillery.
The French forces began a disorderly retreat on the late afternoon of 23 August, the Third Army withdrawing to Verdun chased by the German Fifth Army, and the Fourth Army retreating near Sedan and Stenay. The latter engaged their German pursuers whilst there on 26-28 August, temporarily halting the Germans' progress.
As a consequence of the poorly managed French retreat, the Germans were able to take possession of important iron resources and were able to continue their advance into France.
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The scale of the French defeat was notable, only becoming clear to Joffre after a period of time had elapsed. Even then he was inclined to blame the poor performance of his forces rather than attribute it to strategy and circumstances It did not dissuade him from planning further offensive attacks in the near future.
Battle of Charleroi
The Battle of Charleroi was one of the key battles on the Western Front in 1914, and one of the early major German victories.
The battle comprised a major action fought between the French Fifth Army, advancing north to the River Sambre, and the German Second and Third Armies, moving southwest through Belgium.Charleroi itself was a mid-size industrial town crossing the River Sambre, and was a battlefront stretching approximately 40 km west of Namur where the river joins with the Meuse.
France's pre-war strategy document, Plan XVII, determined that the French Fifth Army should join Third and Fourth Armies in an invasion of Germany through the Ardennes. This however assumed that Germany would not attempt an invasion of France further north. Whilst Lanrezac, Fifth Army commander, believed this a distinct possibility, particularly as he observed a massive build-up of German forces in Belgium, Joffre, the French Commander-in-Chief, refused to consider the possibility.
Joffre did however allow Lanrezac to extend his lines northwest to the Sambre on 12 August; but at the same time Lanrezac lost some of his Fifth Army troops, transferred to the Ardennes offensive; they were replaced by a corps from the Second Army in Lorraine.
Following repeated warnings by Lanrezac, Joffre agreed that he could concentrate his forces further north on 20 August. By this time however units of von Bulow's German Second Army were nearing Namur.It was not a good time for the Allies: that same day the Germans marched into Brussels.
In authorising an attack across the river, Joffre expected the German forces to comprise of no more than 18 divisions, against which would be ranged Lanrezac's 15 divisions with reinforcements arriving from the BEF adding another three divisions Lanrezac however believed the German strength to be much higher, nearer in fact to the real figure of 38 divisions. Consequently, he asked for a postponement of the attack on 21 August, preferring to wait for the arrival of the British.
However, detachments from the German Second Army attacked across the Sambre that same morning, establishing and then successfully defending two bridgeheads against repeated French counter-attacks. Thousands of Belgians fled from Charleroi and nearby villages.
Von Bulow renewed his attacks the following day, pitching three corps across the entire French front. Fighting was heavy but confused, continuing throughout the day and well into the next. The centre of the French lines, at Charleroi, suffered heavy losses and retreated, whereas the French corps west of Charleroi held its position, as did General Franchet d'Esperey's corps in the far east. Unfortunately, the retreat of General Sordet's cavalry in the far west exposed the right wing of the late-arriving British Expeditionary Force, at Mons.
Von Bulow's forces managed to cross the Meuse but he chose not to position them across the French Fifth Army's rear in the south, instead of ordering a full frontal attack against the French right. General d'Esperey's corps took position in trenches and cleared the Fifth Army's lines of retreat on 23 August.
Lanrezac, having difficulty communicating with d'Esperey, expected the lines of retreat to be closed at any moment. Whilst aware that the German Third Army had established a bridgehead across the Meuse to his south, he did not know that General Mangin's brigade had successfully held them back and was on the verge of a successful counter-attack.
Once news of the Belgian pull-out from Namur reached him, along with the retreat of the French Fourth Army from the Ardennes, Lanrezac ordered a general withdrawal of his forces.
Lanrezac's decision to withdraw probably saved the French Army from destruction By retreating the French were able to hold northern France, but the French public at large - and Joffre - saw Lanrezac's action as simply lacking 'offensive spirit'.
Battle of Mons
The Mons battle signified the first engagement between British and German forces on the Western Front, and began on 23 August 1914.
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Having arrived in France on 14 August, and well behind schedule in its advance, the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) under its Commander-in-Chief, Sir John French, was moving forward cautiously from the Belgian coast, in keeping with French's character, his plan being to meet up with French General Lanrezac's Fifth Army near Charleroi on the Sambre.
Before reaching Charleroi however, the BEF encountered cavalry patrols from the German First Army at Soignies on 22 August. French immediately made plans to attack the German forces, against intelligence advice and apparently unaware of its full strength and of its victories at Lorraine and the Ardennes.
Changing tack overnight, French ordered his five divisions to establish defensive positions at the nearby Mons Canal French's surprise at meeting the German First Army was equalled by its commander, General von Kluck, who had just seen action at the Battle of the Sambre against General Lanrezac's and was intent on chasing Lanrezac to the south.
Distracted, von Kluck determined to launch a frontal attack against the BEF on 23 August, having been forbidden by the German High Command from outflanking the BEF and possibly losing contact with von Bulow's Second Army.
The British Commander-in-Chief ought not to have been too surprised at the sudden appearance and strength of the German army. As early as 7 August General Lanrezac, commanding the French Fifth Army, had warned Joffre, the French Commander-in-Chief, of a sizeable build-up of German strength into Belgium.
Joffre initially appeared not to heed Lanrezac's warnings, perhaps because they conflicted with France's pre-war battle strategy, Plan XVII, which assumed that Germany would not attack France via Belgium.
Meanwhile French, who because the initial British-German contact had come via cavalry troops had effectively bought himself a day's respite before battle commenced, deployed his two infantry corps, commanded by Smith-Dorrienand Haig, respectively, east and west of Mons across a forty kilometre front.
The eastern wing almost reached the retreating French Fifth Army under General Lanrezac, some eight miles away Edmund Allenby's cavalry division was held in reserve in case of need.
At the start of the battle the British found themselves heavily outnumbered by their German opposition: 70,000 troops as opposed to 160,000, and 300 guns against 600 German.
Despite such odds, von Kluck's offensive against General Smith-Dorrien following a preliminary artillery barrage, began disastrously, the British riflemen exacting heavy losses from the advancing German infantry.
Indeed, by mid-afternoon he had no progress to show for the offensive. Nevertheless over the course of the first few days of fighting the British had suffered some 1,600 casualties The efficiency of the British riflemen was such that von Kluck assumed that the enemy were using machine-guns.
Whilst von Kluck paused the attack in order to draft in reserves, French, having heard news that General Lanrezac had retreated and could therefore offer the British no assistance, ordered a strategic retreat to the British second line of defence.
Von Kluck renewed the offensive in the evening, by which time French had realised quite how strong von Kluck's forces were. French therefore ordered Smith-Dorrien and Haig to further retreat; von Kluck did not at first give chase, choosing instead to address the heavy casualties inflicted earlier in the day. Ultimately however he inflicted almost 8,000 casualties upon the British rear-guard at the Battle of Le Cateau on 26 August.
The British Commander-in-Chief then undertook an extended retreat French himself recommended complete withdrawal to the coast, although Kitchener, the British war minister, rejected French's suggestion, requiring the BEF to remain in contact with the French forces retreating to the Marne.